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* 
As it comes out of the crisis, the world economy faces two apparently conflicting 
demands.  On the one hand, achieving global macroeconomic stability and preventing a 
protectionist backlash will require that we avoid large current account imbalances of the type that 
the world economy experienced in the run-up to the crisis.  On the other hand, returning to rapid 
growth in the developing nations will require that they resume their conquest of global market 
share in tradable goods.        
The challenge of meeting both demands is epitomized by the contentious U.S-China 
bilateral relationship.  American (and European) policy makers blame China for an undervalued 
renminbi, which they argue is the root cause of China’s huge trade surplus.  Chinese leaders 
resist the pressure, fearing that appreciation will undercut the competitiveness of Chinese goods 
in world markets, hurt exports, and damage growth.  The Western answer to this concern is that 
China needs to replace foreign demand with domestic demand as the engine of growth.   
But if growth depends primarily on the supply of modern manufactured products and 
other tradables as opposed to services and non-tradables, as I will argue here, the Chinese 
position has more force than critics give it credit.  The conventional fix for China’s current 
account surplus, consisting of a combination of expenditure expansion and currency 
appreciation, will shift the structure of the economy away from tradables and towards non-
tradables.  This may be good for macroeconomic balance in China and elsewhere, but it will 
almost certainly have adverse effects on China’s growth—perhaps large enough to even 
endanger the country’s social and political stability. 
                                                 
* Parts of this paper draw heavily on Rodrik (2009).  I thank Nicholas Lardy, Yingyi Qian, Anthony Saich, Shang-
Jin Wei, Wing Thye Woo, and Martin Whyte for very helpful discussions on China.  
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The good news is that there is no inherent conflict between China’s growth and other 
countries’ desire to have reasonably balanced external accounts.  What matters for growth in 
developing nations like China is not the size of their trade surplus, nor even the volume of their 
exports.  What matters for growth is their output of non-traditional tradables, which can expand 
without limit as long as domestic demand (for those same goods) expands at the same time.   
So there is a simple solution.  It is possible to let the renminbi appreciate, and hence 
eliminate the trade surplus, as long as complementary policies are put in place to support modern 
tradables more directly.  Such policies, combined with macroeconomic policies targeted at the 
current account, can achieve both external balance and structural change in favor of modern 
tradables.  It is better to subsidize tradables directly than to subsidize them indirectly through the 
exchange rate which also happens to tax the domestic consumption of tradables.   
There are many ways in which the profitability of tradables can be enhanced, including 
reducing the cost of non-traded inputs and services through appropriately targeted investments in 
infrastructure.  But industrial policies, including explicit subsidies on tradables, are likely to be 
part of the arsenal as well (Rodrik 2008a, 2009).  An important implication, therefore, is that the 
external policy environment will have to be more tolerant of such policies, as long as the effects 
on the trade balance are neutralized through appropriate adjustments in the real exchange rate.  
Permissiveness on industrial policies is the “price” to be paid for greater discipline on currency 
practices and external imbalances.        
 
I.  Promote tradables if you want growth 
What is common in the experiences of Japan, South Korea, China, and all other growth 
superstars is that they based their growth strategies on developing industrial capabilities, rather   3
than on specializing according to their prevailing comparative advantages.  They each became 
manufacturing superpowers in short order—and much more rapidly than one would have 
expected based on their resource endowments.  China’s export bundle was built up using 
strategic public investments and industrial policies that forced foreign companies to transfer 
technology, and as a result resembles one for a country that is three or four times as rich.   
The lesson is this.  High-growth countries are those that are able to undertake rapid 
structural transformation from low-productivity (“traditional”) to high-productivity (“modern”) 
activities.  These modern activities are largely tradable products, and within tradables, they are 
mostly industrial ones (although tradable services are clearly becoming important as well).  In 
other words, poor countries become rich by producing what rich countries produce.   
Why is transition into modern industrial activities an engine of economic growth?  As I 
discuss in Rodrik (2008b) and in line with a long tradition of dual-economy models, the answer 
is that there exist significant gaps between the social marginal productivities in traditional and 
modern parts of developing economies.  Even vey poor economies have economic activities—
horticulture in Ethiopia, auto assembly in India, consumer electronics in China—where 
productivity levels are not too far off from what we observe in the advanced economies.  As 
resources move from traditional activities towards these, economy-wide productivity increases. 
These gaps can be due to a wide range of features that are specific to under-development.  
I discuss two broad categories in Rodrik (2008b).  One has to do with institutional weaknesses—
such as poor protection of property rights and weak contract enforcement—which make 
themselves felt more intensively in tradable activities.  The second relates to various market 
failures and externalities—e.g., learning spillovers and coordination failures—associated with 
modern activities.  In both cases, industrial activity and investment are underprovided in market   4
equilibrium.  Anything that speeds up structural transformation in their direction will speed up 
the rate of economic growth. 
Even though actual policies have differed significantly across successful countries, one 
can still identify some important common elements.  First, it is clear that sound “fundamentals” 
have played a role, as long as we interpret the term quite broadly and not associate it with any 
specific laundry list of policies (such as the Washington Consensus or the governance reforms 
that are in fashion currently).  Second, all successful countries have followed what one might call 
“productivist” policies.  These are activist policies aimed at enhancing the profitability of 
modern industrial activities and accelerating the movement of resources towards modern 
industrial activities.  They go considerably beyond the conventional recommendation to reduce 
red tape, corruption, and the cost of doing business.  They entail in addition (or sometimes 
instead): explicit industrial policies in support of new economic activities (trade protection, 
subsidies, tax and credit incentives, special government attention); undervalued currencies to 
promote tradables; and a certain degree of repression of finance, to enable subsidized credit, 
development banking, and currency undervaluation. 
It is true that industrial policies have often failed.  But it is also true that it is virtually 
impossible to identify countries, whether in Asia (South Korea, Taiwan) or in Latin America 
(Chile), that have done well without them. Just as it is the case with fiscal policy, say, or 
education policy, what distinguishes good performers from bad performers is not the presence or 
absence of the policy, but the skill with which it has been implemented. 
  The reason that undervaluation of the currency works as a powerful force for economic 
growth is that it acts as a kind of industrial policy.  By raising the domestic relative price of 
tradable economic activities, it increases the profitability of such activities, and spurs capacity   5
and employment generation in the modern industrial sectors that are key to growth.  As discussed 
in detail in Rodrik (2008b), the association between undervalued currencies and high growth is a 
very robust feature of the post-war data, particularly for lower-income countries.          
  Undervaluation has the practical advantage, compared to explicit industrial policies, of 
being an across-the-board policy not requiring selectivity and therefore entailing fewer agency 
problems (rent-seeking and corruption).  Perhaps this accounts for its widespread success in 
promoting development. But it also has several disadvantages.  Most important in the present 
context, it acts also as a domestic tax on the consumption of tradables (as it raises the relative 
price of imported goods).  That is why it produces an excess supply of tradables—a trade 
surplus.  The last point is of special relevance to the case of China.   
 
II.  China and currency undervaluation 
China has not always had a large external imbalance, or an undervalued currency.  In 
fact, prior to the present decade it never had a current account surplus exceeding 4 percent (of 
GDP).  After having jumped to nearly that level in 1997 during the Asian financial crisis, its 
surplus steadily fell until 2001, which is the year when things turned around.  From 2001 on, 
China’s surplus began its inexorable rise to more than 10 percent by 2007.  The index of 
undervaluation I used in Rodrik (2008b) similarly bottoms out in 2001 and increases thereafter.  
Interestingly, 2001 also saw China joining the World Trade Organization, after years of 
negotiation.  Is it a coincidence that China’s current account imbalance began to widen and its 
currency undervaluation started to rise just as the country became a member of the trade body? 
Perhaps not.  WTO membership made it difficult, if not impossible, for China to promote 
its industries with the type of explicit industrial policies that the country had been relying on.     6
Prior to the late 1990s, China’s manufacturing industries were promoted by a wide variety of 
inducements, including high tariff barriers, investment incentives, export subsidies, and domestic 
content requirements on foreign firms.  As a condition of membership, China had to phase out 
these policies.  From levels that were among the highest in the world as late as the early 1990s 
China’s import tariffs fell to single-digit levels by the end of the decade.  Local content 
requirements and export subsidies were eliminated.  Currency undervaluation, or protection 
through the exchange rate, became the de facto substitute. 
If undervaluation has supported China’s recent growth, what kind of growth penalty 
would the economy suffer if China were to let its currency appreciate (in the absence of 
compensating changes in industrial policies)?  In Rodrik (2008b), I report panel regressions 
which suggest that the partial correlation between my index of (log) undervaluation and annual 
growth rate is 0.026 for developing nations. (For reasons explained in that paper, I am inclined to 
think of this relationship as causal.)  However, in the case of China this estimate rises to 0.086, a 
much bigger number that may be due to the large reservoir of surplus labor and the huge gap in 
the productivity levels of modern and traditional parts of the economy.  This estimate implies 
that a 10 percent appreciation would reduce China’s growth by 0.86 percentage points.   
By many accounts, including my own estimates (based on price-level comparisons with 
adjustments for Balassa-Samuelson effects), China’s currency is undervalued by around 25 
percent.  Correcting this undervaluation would result in a reduction in Chinese growth of 2.15 
percentage points per annum (=0.25x0.086).  This is a sizable effect, even by the standards of 
China’s superlative growth record.  Most importantly, a slowdown of this magnitude would put 
China below the 8 percent growth threshold its leadership apparently believes is necessary to 
maintain social peace and avert social strife.     7
No-one knows where the 8 percent figure really comes from; it clearly does not have a 
scientific basis.  Many China experts think the Chinese society and polity are capable of handling 
growth much lower than that.  Nevertheless, even if the political implications can be put aside, it 
would be hardly a desirable outcome if the most potent poverty-reduction engine the world has 
ever known were to experience a noticeable slow down.  It is true that other countries that relied 
on exports to grow rapidly—such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea—eventually had to let 
their currencies appreciate.  But China is still a very poor country, at barely above one-tenth the 
income level of the U.S.  It has a huge reservoir of surplus labor in the countryside.  In addition, 
it has to live with restrictions on its industrial policies that none of these other countries, in pre-
WTO days, had to abide by.    
 
III.  Is the key the trade surplus, exports, or the production of tradables? 
The real exchange rate affects the trade balance, the supply of exports, and the production 
of tradables.  Which of these is the channel through which an undervaluation spurs growth?   
Consider the difference between the “exports” and “tradables” stories.  For export 
quantitites to matter for growth over the longer term, one must believe either in learning or other 
spillovers from exports, which have been hard to document, or in the explanation I sketched out 
above, in which tradables are special because that is where the higher productivity activities are 
found.  The two accounts differ on the importance they attach to the act of exporting per se.  The 
“spillovers-from-exporting” story relies on the technological or marketing externalities that are 
created when a tradable good crosses an international boundary.  The “tradables-are-special” 
story is indifferent to whether international trade actually takes place or not.   8
In Rodrik (2009) I ran a series of horse races between these contending mechanisms.  I 
estimated growth regressions with fixed effects for countries and time periods, using a panel of 
five-year subperiods.  The regressors, in addition to the fixed effects, were lagged income (to 
account for convergence), the share of industrial value added in GDP, the share of exports in 
GDP, and the trade surplus as a percent of GDP.   
When industry and export shares are included together, both are statistically significant, 
but the estimated impact of industrial activity is more than twice as powerful.  A one standard-
deviation increase in industrial shares is estimated to increase growth by 1.6 percentage points, 
while the corresponding increase in export shares boosts growth only by 0.7 percentage points.  
Moreover, it turns out that the result with export shares is not robust.  When the sample is 
restricted to post-1990 data or a few observations corresponding to countries with very high 
export shares (e.g., Luxemburg and Hong Kong) are excluded, the estimated coefficient on 
exports becomes insignificant.  Perhaps most importantly, when we restrict the sample to 
developing countries, the coefficient on the export share turns slightly negative (and is 
statistically insignificant), while the coefficient on the industry share rises and remains strongly 
significant.  The horse race between industrial activity and export orientation has a clear winner. 
The horse race between industry shares and trade surpluses also produces a clear winner.  
Once industry shares in GDP are controlled for, trade surpluses exert no additional positive 
effect on economic growth.  This is true for the full sample, for post-1990 data, for samples in 
which large trade deficits or surpluses have been removed, and for samples restricted to 
developing countries.  In each one of these runs, the industry variable is highly significant while 
the trade surplus is not.               9
  The implication for China and developing nations that have gotten hooked on trade 
surpluses or exports as their “engines of growth” is clear: what really matters is the output of 
tradables (here proxied by industrial production).  Neither exports nor trade surpluses are key as 
long as domestic demand for tradables can be increased alongside the domestic supply.   
 
IV.  Structural change and growth without trade surpluses 
  Let us return to the interpretation underlying the growth dynamics that I sketched out 
above.  In this perspective poor countries are poor because too few of their resources are in 
modern, high productivity activities.  Fast growth happens when there is rapid structural 
transformation from low-productivity traditional sectors to high-productivity modern activities. 
The reason this transformation is not an automatic, market-led process is that there are severe 
market or institutional failures whose costs are borne disproportionately by the modern sectors.  
Sometimes transformation is blocked because of low domestic saving and high cost of capital, 
which keep investment and structural change sluggish.  But more typically the problem is a large 
wedge between private and social returns in modern sectors. These sectors are subject both to 
learning spillovers and coordination failures and to high costs imposed by weaknesses in legal 
and regulatory institutions.  These weaknesses are hard to remove in short order, and the 
experience of advanced economies is that they are addressed only through the long course of 
decades, if not centuries.     
So while it would be desirable to address these shortcomings directly, by removing 
market failures and fixing institutions, as a practical matter such an agenda is too broad and 
ambitious and hence too unrealistic.  As noted previously, successful countries have pursued 
growth strategies that alleviate these constraints indirectly, by raising the relative profitability of   10
modern activities through other means.  What all these strategies have in common is that they act 
as subsidies on tradables.         
Once we strip these strategies to their essence, it becomes easier to understand what is 
central and what is incidental to their working.  In particular, we can see that a strategy of 
subsidizing tradables need not be associated with undervalued exchange rates and trade 
surpluses.  It is possible to enhance production incentives for tradables, and do so by as wide a 
margin as is necessary, without creating spillovers to the rest of the world in terms of trade 
imbalances.  Unlike currency undervaluation, which taxes domestic consumption of tradables, a 
policy of explicitly subsidizing tradables (combined with macroeconomic policies that maintain 
external balance) boosts the domestic consumption of tradables.   
What form should this subsidy take in practice?  As discussed in Rodrik (2009), there are 
three broad approaches: (a) industrial policies; (ii) reducing input costs for tradables; and (iii) 
incomes policies.  All of these pose practical policies in implementation, so the appropriate mix 
depends on the circumstances of each country.  
In principle, industrial policy is ideally suited to the problem at hand. What needs to be 
done is to enhance the relative profitability of non-traditional products that face large 
information externalities or coordination failures, or which suffer particularly strongly from the 
poor institutional environment.  That is what good industrial policy attempts to do.  Tax 
exemptions, directed credit, payroll subsidies, investment subsidies, export processing zones are 
some of the forms in which industrial policy gets implemented.  What is distinctive about these 
policies is that they target specific firms or sectors, and therefore privilege some at the expense 
of others.  That is what makes industrial policy controversial of course.  But as long as the 
targeting is done broadly well—as long as it focuses on new activities at the outer margins of a   11
country’s underlying competence—the potential upside is large.  The advantage of industrial 
policy relative to currency undervaluation is precisely that it allows greater fine tuning and 
discrimination: traditional tradables (such as primary products and industrial products in which a 
country has already established itself) need not be subsidized, and the consumption of tradables 
need not be taxed.   
There is still a sense in which subsidies on modern tradables can spill across borders.  
Even if the net supply of tradables does not increase in aggregate, the net supply of those that are 
targeted for promotion will.  Other countries will be in the receiving end of this, and if they 
remain passive, their own industrialization incentives will be blunted.  But the right way of 
expressing this problem is to say that the use of “optimal” industrial policies in some countries 
increases the costs of not using such policies in others.  As some countries alleviate their market 
imperfections, the costs of not dealing with these imperfections get exacerbated elsewhere.  So as 
long as all countries are following industrial policies that are optimal from their perspective, 
there are no spillovers to contend with.  The spillovers in question can be effectively neutralized 
as long as other (developing) countries are following appropriate industrial policies as well.   
The main external obstacle to the wider use of industrial policies by the larger developing 
countries is the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies.  This Agreement prohibits the use of subsidies 
which take the form of fiscal expenditures conditioned on export performance.  More seriously, 
it also renders “actionable” the use of subsidies that have the effect of increasing exports, even if 
they are not directly conditioned on exports.  (Least developed countries are exempt from these 
rules.)  A literal application of this standard would rule of many kinds of industrial policies, the 
objective of which is precisely to increase the domestic supply of tradables.     12
In a world where economic growth requires the encouragement of modern economic 
activities in developing nations, the Agreement on Subsidies makes little economic sense. It rules 
out a desirable second-best policy for promoting economic diversification and structural change.  
It has the unintended consequence of inducing governments to favor an inferior policy (in view 
of its spillovers into trade imbalances), namely undervalued currencies.  Worse still, it may 
encourage trade protection as a defensive measure against industrial imports.  If we want greater 
international oversight on currency practices, as I think we should, we will need to substantially 
relax discipline over industrial subsidies.       
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